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Philosophy

Can Nonhumans Be Victims of Genocide?
Chairperson: Deborah Slicer
“Genocide” appears commonly in critical animal studies literature and sparsely in philosophy to
describe human-caused violence against nonhuman beings. However, such uses of the term have
rarely been informed by relevant work in genocide studies, nor otherwise formally substantiated.
This thesis explores what is at stake when employing the term and proposes a model for
appropriate application to nonhuman contexts. Claudia Card’s notion of genocide as social death
allows for the consideration of nonhuman animals as victims of genocide. Social vitality is
important to the lives of some nonhuman animals and its forcible diminishment results in social
death for those nonhuman groups. Thus, instances of violence that inflict social death among
nonhuman animals are genocide. By recognizing that nonhumans are, in fact, rendered victims
of genocide through human violence against them, we challenge the anthropocentric bias that is
fundamental to all genocidal perpetration.
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Can Nonhumans Be Victims of Genocide?
The “question of animality” is not one question among others, of course. I have long considered it to be
decisive (as one says), in itself and for its strategic value; and that’s because, while it is difficult and enigmatic
in itself, it also represents the limit upon which all the great questions are formed and determined, as well as
all the concepts that attempt to delimit what is “proper to man,” the essence and future of humanity, ethics,
politics, law, “human rights,” “crimes against humanity,” “genocide,” etc. – Jacques Derrida, “Violence
Against Animals”
The first people who were struck by a certain number of points in common between the Holocaust and the
industrial massacre of animals were not fanatical advocates of the animal cause but precisely the victims of
this genocide – survivors or people who had lost close relatives. They were the ones who – almost against their
will – found themselves describing the bitter memories of the Shoah that came over them when they were
confronted by the reality of the slaughterhouses. They were the ones who were struck by the similarities
between the functioning of the camps and that of industrial breeding operations: the large-scale, methodical
organization of the killing, the stripping of all value from the lives of other beings, the convenient ignorance
shown by the surrounding population. Lucy, whose two young sisters were struck down by the Nazis before
their father’s eyes, tells us: ‘I have been haunted my whole life by the images of the Shoah, and there is no
doubt that I was attracted to animal rights in part because of the similarities I felt between the institutionalized
exploitation of animals and the Nazi genocide.’ – Matthieu Ricard, A Plea for the Animals

Since its coinage during the Holocaust, “genocide” has been a term reserved for violence
against humans. Simultaneously, many writers and activists have made comparisons between the
Holocaust and human violence against nonhuman animals, or have identified such violence as
genocide. A character in J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals calls this move a cheap and
tirelessly familiar comparison (Coetzee 1999, 50). But what, exactly, is illicit about the use of the
term “genocide” to discuss harms against nonhumans? Can nonhumans be victims of genocide?
What is at stake in our choice to include or exclude them from our understanding of genocide?
To date there has been no systematic philosophical investigation of the term and its use in
describing nonhuman contexts. Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond have written on Coetzee’s
novella, supporting his protagonist’s recognition of genocidal violence against nonhuman
animals (Cavell, Diamond, et al. 2008). Jacques Derrida has been famously quoted for his use of
“genocide” to describe factory farming practices (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004). Still others
have discussed harms against nonhumans as holocaustal or genocidal. Isaac Bashevis Singer is

widely cited for writing that “all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka”
(“The Letter Writer” 1968). Yet these mentions do not justify or explain the use of “genocide”
beyond the assumption that there is evident connection between the treatment of human genocide
victims and the treatment of nonhuman animals.
Karen Davis writes about animal genocide more thoroughly in a section of her piece,
“Chicken-Human Relationships” (2010). She cites Rafał Lemkin’s definition of genocide, noting
that genocide “includes physical, cultural, and ideological forms of victim annihilation” and
attacks the victim group for its identity (Davis 2010, 256). Describing the harmful factory
farming practices against chickens, she makes a case for such practices as genocidal because
they impose not only physical horrors against individuals but proliferate “in virtually endless reformations of animal bodies to fit the procrustean beds of global industrial agriculture and
research” (Davis 2010, 258). Yet Davis’ argument is focused exclusively on agricultural
practices, and has also received little attention regarding her use of the term “genocide” for
nonhuman contexts.
Genocide studies scholars and philosophers of genocide have hardly touched this issue as
well. This paper offers a possible way to substantiate the use of the term “genocide” for violence
against nonhuman animals through the work of feminist philosopher Claudia Card. Her
definition of genocide as social death both identifies the characteristic harm of genocide and
opens the possibility for meaningful discussion about atrocities against nonhuman animals. Other
species derive their wellbeing from social relationships, a social vitality that is often diminished
by human violence. As scholarship continues to blossom in the areas of animal psychology and
animal culture, using the term “genocide” for nonhuman victims is a reminder of our own human
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animality and the attributes shared across species that make genocide deplorable regardless of
whether victims are human or nonhuman animals.

Responding to resistance
I suspect that much of the resistance to talking about nonhuman animals in this way is
motivated by anthropocentric and speciesist tendencies. That is, humans have historically
exploited nonhumans and differentiated themselves (arbitrarily!) over nonhuman others so
frequently that we may seek to uphold this metaphysical distinction out of habit. This project to
inquire into genocidal violence against nonhumans is meant to suggest that harms suffered by
nonhuman entities are not, categorically, lesser harms to those suffered by humans. Our
willingness to examine whether nonhumans can be victims of genocide is an expression of
parity, a gesture toward transforming our ethics in this time of global ecological crisis.
Humans are animals, and so it should not be surprising that other animal bodies undergo
trauma in similar ways to human bodies. This is not to say that there are no differences between
humans and other animal species; of course, there are. But if the symptoms of genocide that we
recognize in humans are observable in nonhumans, it is hubristic to dismiss nonhuman animals
as possible victims. Animal psychology expert Frans de Waal has done considerable work to
show the complex minds and inner lives of nonhuman animals. He argues that there is no other
honest way to describe the characteristics that other animals have but through the very language
we use to describe our own human attributes (Primates and Philosophers 2006, 67). For we
share with many other animals self-awareness and complex emotions, social intelligence and
learning processes. Such features in humans appear differently than those in other species, but
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recently more and more reputable science has seriously challenged old assumptions about human
beings as separate and unique from other animals.
Still, anthropocentrism is thoroughly ingrained in much of human society, and it is
difficult for many to acknowledge the agency, intelligence, and culture of any nonhumans. De
Waal sees this inertia as unacceptable:
While it is true that animals are not humans, it is equally true that humans are
animals. Resistance to this simple yet undeniable truth is… anthropodenial, the a
priori rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals.
Anthropodenial denotes willful blindness to the human-like characteristics of
animals, or the animal-like characteristics of ourselves (2006, 65).
In order to combat the willful blindness of anthropodenial, it is an appropriate and timely task to
uncover the biases in our language, as Derrida suggests. “Genocide” is one such term that has
been anthropocentrically applied.
Why might use of the term “genocide” be appropriate to discuss violence against
nonhumans? Use of the term shows a willingness to take nonhuman animals seriously, to
acknowledge that they can be victims of human-perpetrated atrocities. Informed and
substantiated use of the term has the potential to recognize the shared material harm that victims
of any genocide suffer. I do not mean to suggest that victims of genocide suffer in the exact same
way. There are irreducible differences of every atrocity. The instances of violence are not
identical to one another and yet they share relevant features. Genocide inflicts a kind of harm
that is similar across its iterations. If nonhumans suffer violence that we would call genocidal
when perpetrated against humans, then “genocide” may be an appropriate term, simply because
such violence wreaks immense damage upon the mental, emotional, physical, and social health
of many species. Applying the term to nonhuman contexts also acknowledges that genocide’s
particular kind of harm is enabled through a logic of justification, regardless of who the victims
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are. Such genocidal logic inflicts violence against human groups as it does against nonhuman
groups.
Karen Warren describes this phenomenon as the “logic of domination.” In all instances of
domineering – whether by one group of persons over another or with value concepts (such as
“human” over “animal”) – the actions of domination follow a logical “structure of argumentation
which leads to a justification of subordination” (Warren 1990, 128). Without this mechanism to
justify why one group or concept is superior to another, we are left only with descriptive
differences between the groups or concepts. The logic of domination provides the justification
for moral inequality between two groups. As but one example, the Hutu government propaganda
in the years leading up to and during the Rwandan genocide called the Tutsi people inyenzi, or
cockroaches. This tactic was used to support and incite violence against the Tutsi: by the logic of
domination, humans are superior to insects and are morally allowed to dominate insects because
they are superior. The Tutsi suffered horrific violence through this justification. Though its
implementation has features specific to the particular context in which it is used, the logic of
domination adheres the same structure of reasoning to all instances of oppression.
Genocides are linked through the means of their justification by perpetrators: through a
logic of domination (whether consciously or implicitly employed). And, one shared feature of
human genocides is the dehumanization of victims, such as the Tutsi portrayed as cockroaches.
“Genocide” might rightly refer to harms against human and nonhuman animals because it is an
acknowledgement that the logic of domination is deployed in both cases. In human and
nonhuman cases, victims of genocide suffer because they are thrust into the space outside of our
moral consideration. But this move to recognize the shared mechanism of justification for
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violence against humans and nonhuman animals may not be enough to substantiate the use of
“genocide” to acknowledge nonhuman victims, so I will build a further case.
In the following sections I discuss reasons why some people might be resistant to using
“genocide” to describe harms against nonhuman beings. I have roughly categorized these
concerns into three categories: (1) the lingual and etymological constraints of the term
“genocide,” (2) that comparative work in genocide demeans victims of genocide, and (3) that
instances of harm against nonhuman beings should be identified with language other than
“genocide.”

Etymological constraints
Resistance to the application of “genocide” for nonhuman contexts is encouraged by the
current legal and societal uses of the term and its etymology. Translations of the term in some
languages denote that only humans can be victims of genocide. In the German, for example, the
word is Völkermord, literally “people-murder,” constituted by the word for human people, Volk,
and the word for killing, murder, and homicide, Mord. The same connotations arise in
Scandinavian translations of the term. These translations add the human dimension to “genocide”
when its linguistic roots in fact do not necessitate human victims. Despite such translations, there
is no etymological reason why “genocide” cannot function as a descriptor for violence against
nonhumans.
“Genocide” comes from the Greek genos and the French-Latin -cide or -cida. Since Rafał
Lemkin coined the English term “genocide” in 1944, genos has frequently been cited as denoting
“race” or “tribe.” English-speakers do not usually recognize “races” in nonhuman animals, which
suggests that “genocide” is only appropriate when discussing human victims. Lemkin’s book,
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Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, brought the term into international law, where it was adopted
officially in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly for the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Convened on the heels of the Shoah, the UN’s
definition of genocide was colored by the characteristics of the Holocaust under National
Socialism. With the Holocaust in view, where the Jewish people suffered intentional and
systematic violence for their elimination, “genocide” was said to target human races or tribes.
Yet constricting genos to mean only “race” or “tribe” is a parochial view of the historical
usage of the root: genos has been widely and consistently circulated in Greek of all periods,
varying in purpose. It has been used to denote “species,” “sort,” “kind,” “category,” “kin,”
“lineage,” “family,” “genus,” “race,” and “generation,” among other meanings (Oxford Classical
Dictionary 2015). Retaining historical fidelity to the roots of the word, English speakers, at least,
can responsibly use the term “genocide” to talk about harms against nonhumans – especially
because the Greek genos does not require specifically human groups. Still “genocide”
contemporarily retains the connotation that it describes violence only against human victims, and
this is partially due to how genocide is officially defined.
The UN serves as an international authority (at least in name), and its definition of the
phenomenon has sway on international policy and indirectly upon societal understandings of
genocide. The 1948 Convention was aimed toward addressing the crimes of National Socialism
and preventing similar harms from being perpetrated. Article II of the Convention reads:
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group. (UN 1948)
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Although the language of the Convention at least appears broad enough to describe other
genocides, the definition draws its justification from the specific violence of the Shoah. Because
the Shoah has been called the paradigmatic instance of genocide, especially at the time of the
Convention, the definition based upon this paradigm carries the characteristic features of that
violence – namely, the clear intention to destroy an entire population of people by means of
physical massacre. The definition thereby reinforces these Holocaust characteristics as essential
to genocide, even if the language of the definition seems more generalized. Initiated by the
Convention and following its definition, early genocide studies also focused almost exclusively
upon the Holocaust rather than upon other genocides or comparative studies of genocide.
Some scholars have maintained that the Holocaust is and should be the paradigm
occurrence of genocide, and still others have promoted an extreme stance that the Holocaust is
the only genocide. This latter position was most prominently held by Steven T. Katz, who argued
that understanding the term correctly means accepting the atrocity against European Jewry
during World War II as the unique instance of genocide (Novick 199, 196). Since then, scholars
in genocide studies have repeatedly argued that the Genocide Convention’s definition of the term
is too narrow (Zimmerer 2017, 8). The adamant cries of “never again” heard worldwide after the
Shoah were notably absent and did not rally international intervention during the Rwandan
genocide, the genocide in Darfur, and the genocide against the Rohingya (to name a few) (Kelly
2000; Penketh 2005; Fisher 2017). In the face of these atrocities, Katz’ view unfairly limits
“genocide” and renders it unuseful for the identification and intervention into other instances that
might, in fact, be genocidal. The view of the Holocaust as paradigmatic might also unfairly limit
“genocide” insofar as it is believed to be a rigid model of every genocidal instance. Atrocities
have similarities, and distinguishing their shared characteristics among their contextual features
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is necessary for the prevention of such violence. The term “genocide” must be defined in a way
that genocidal atrocities are actually, if ever only partially, described.

The limits of genocidal comparison
The Katzian view expresses a common worry surrounding the work of comparison
between atrocities. It says that any comparison between the Holocaust and other atrocities
against humans diminishes the breadth and depth of the suffering of Shoah victims. More
generally, there is a concern that the act of comparing genocidal atrocities degrades victim
experience and dishonors those who should be remembered and protected. This worry primarily
expresses a desire for victims to be recognized for their unique experiences. Generalizing must
zoom out from the particular details, and generalizations about violent atrocities do not reflect
the unique features of individual atrocities.
I sympathize with the desire to honor and bear witness to victims’ experiences. Bearing
witness to pain is a powerful expression of solidarity with victims and their communities and is
often incredibly motivating in enacting change. Victims’ experience and the particular, complex
details of an atrocity should be analyzed and shared. It seems that the creation of collective
memory to respect victims is impelled by a desire to prevent future violence. Prevention requires
an acknowledgement that the influencing factors upon any atrocity will never occur quite the
same way again. Atrocities are material events that each have their own irreducible
particularities: they have their own phenomenological features and arise from specific contexts.
Yet there is no logical reason why defining the commonalities between these atrocities
diminishes their individual characteristics. Understanding qualities of genocide in general must
not erase victim experience. Even when they share attributes, genocides cannot be folded into

9

one because of each genocide’s distinctive events, violence, and horror. Some genocides are
even identified by their own terms, such as how the historical event of genocide as perpetrated
by German National Socialism in the twentieth century is described by the terms “Holocaust”
and “Shoah.” These terms evoke the particularities of that violence, those victims, this horror.1
Comparison does not in itself eradicate the important aspects of victims’ experience. Most
scholars agree that “genocide” has some traction in describing a kind of atrocity that several
instances share, and that the term ought to have international purchase in order for the prevention
and intervention of atrocities. We can honor victims of genocide by remembering them and
bearing witness to their experience, and also by ensuring that genocide is prevented, recognized,
and halted. For these tasks, we need an appropriate term that acknowledges what these atrocities
have in common.
Further, resisting comparison may suggest a more problematic view, namely that we
ought to hierarchize our concern for atrocities because there is limited moral energy that we can
devote to such issues. It is true that individuals experience limits upon their moral energy and
comportment, but this does not mean that larger human communities cannot address multiple
moral problems at once. There is no finitude to concern and care that necessitates our sustained
disengagement from particular issues. Addressing police brutality against Black people does not
necessitate that we cannot address poor employment conditions for migrant and undocumented
workers. Pragmatically, of course, there are difficulties surrounding how resources are allocated
toward different ends, but ethically there is no convincing reason why we cannot be moved to act
on multiple issues.
It is perhaps easier to see the force of this perceived problem, which I will call “moral
finitude,” when people resist addressing moral concerns surrounding nonhuman animals. The
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argument is some version of the following: “How can we care about violence against animals
when there is horrible violence happening to people?” In this question about moral finitude there
is an implicit hierarchy that some moral issues deserve our attention over others. Carol Adams
calls this a “hierarchy of caring” in which some acts of caring are hostile to other acts (“War on
Compassion” 2016, 3). In this case, a hierarchy between humans and nonhuman animals is
maintained wherein humans are first priority: it says that people must care about other humans
before they can care about nonhumans, and that caring about nonhumans is somehow
detrimental to addressing human injustice.
This hierarchy of care is mistaken because caring about nonhumans does not necessitate
less care for human issues. In fact, care about human issues and nonhuman animals is
interpenetrative, because violence against each are interdependent, as the Rwandan cockroach
propaganda exemplifies (Adams 2016, 4). Caring about multiple genocides, whether it be a
comparison between the Holocaust and other genocidal atrocities or instances of violence against
both humans and nonhumans, does not necessitate the disrespect of victims. If instances of
violence meet the requirements of the definition of genocide, then those instances against
nonhuman animals can be called genocide without disrespecting human victims and their
communities.
However, the objection to the application of “genocide” to describe nonhuman animals
may be more serious than a worry that nonhuman issues distract us from pressing human issues.
People with this objection oppose any comparison with nonhuman animals because they believe
the comparison to be actively insulting to human victims – not merely that it undermines our
ability to respond to violence against humans but that the very act of comparing is illicit and
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prejudiced. This stance is very similar to the worry that the Katzian view expresses: comparison
does damage by likening situations that should not be likened.
Take, as an example of this stance, the reactions to comparison campaigns launched by
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). In 2003 PETA released a campaign and
exhibit called “Holocaust on Your Plate” that displayed photographs of victims in Nazi death
camps alongside photographs of nonhuman animals in slaughterhouses and factory farms. The
Anti-Defamation League responded that the “abusive treatment of animals should be opposed,
but cannot and must not be compared to the Holocaust” (CNN 2003). Two years later, PETA
received complaints about their “Animal Liberation” campaign that juxtaposed images of
American slavery with images of nonhuman animals. One panel showed a photograph of the
lynching of two Black people next to a photograph of a cow hanging in a slaughterhouse.
NAACP officials spoke out in protest of the campaign, and attendees to the display in
Connecticut shouted that it was racist (Los Angeles Times 2005). Bracketing any critique of
PETA itself for the purposes of this example, these comparisons of violence against humans and
nonhuman animals were staunchly opposed as offensive and racist.
It is not news that groups of people have historically been marginalized through
processes of dehumanization. The depiction of people as animals has served to relegate human
groups to a place outside moral consideration where violence against them is permitted. Just as
violence against animals is permitted, so is violence permitted against any being that is not fully
human. The dehumanization, or animalization, of human groups makes it easier for perpetrators
to act violently against them (Patterson 2002, 109). For much of Western human history, societal
authorities have argued and reinforced the idea that human dignity is drawn from not being
animal. Animal life has consistently been conveyed in Western cultures as deplorable, poor,
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unthinking, robotic, and generally abysmal. The biological fact that humans are a kind of animal
is still frequently waved away as an unimportant or inconvenient evolutionary detail. So, when
already marginalized human groups are displayed alongside nonhuman animals or as bearing
similarity to animals, it is quite understandable for people to be upset. The comparison seems to
say that such groups have the same moral status as animals: un-considerable and outside moral
concern. We feel that this comparison serves to diminish humans down to “animal” level, rather
than honoring their agency and traditions and perspectives.
I agree that catastrophic violences like the Holocaust and slavery should never be
trivialized, and I understand why we vehemently oppose these comparisons. The people depicted
in PETA’s photographs have already suffered dastardly events and despicable racism. But is
such a comparison between marginalized humans and nonhumans necessarily racist? My
question is not meant to belittle the important task of identifying and eliminating racism in our
societal practices and rhetoric. I mean only to explore the reasons why we are offended by such
comparisons and ask what our world might look like if we could put aside our ingrained
assumptions about human superiority to animals.
For something to be racist, it must posit one group of people above another, claiming the
superiority of a group over and against another. A racist practice unfairly advantages a “race”
while disadvantaging another “race,” such as police “stop-and-frisk” practices that are used
primarily to investigate Black, LatinX, and other People of Color without sufficient cause. Stopand-frisk practices privilege white people because whites are not stopped without reasonable
cause and they need not normally worry about being stopped.
But do the comparisons between atrocities in human history and the treatment of
nonhuman animals claim that one group of human people is superior to another? Do these
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comparisons discriminate against an “inferior” group? It is true that these campaigns do not show
the supposedly superior race as compared to nonhuman animals. The images do not depict
lynched white people or Aryan Germans emaciated in death camps. Instead, the photographs
reveal the racism rampant in human history, whereby Jews and Blacks have been rendered
“inferior” and have suffered intense and unacceptable brutality.
The campaigns certainly intend to show a purported “superior” group and “inferior”
group. These campaigns are descriptive rather than normative – they do not demand that groups
labeled as “inferior” should be so labeled. On a very deep level, these comparisons operate upon
our assumptions that humans are superior to nonhuman animals. The offense we take to PETA’s
campaigns relies on the assumption that human suffering cannot and should not be equated to
animal experience. It hinges upon an acceptance of a hierarchical ordering of moral demands that
upholds the human as superior and permits the subjugation of inferior nonhuman animals.
Marjorie Spiegel puts it this way:
With the exception of those who still cling – either overtly or subtly – to racist
thought, most members of our society have reached the conclusion that it was and
is wrong to treat blacks ‘like animals.’ But with regard to the animals themselves,
most still feel that it is acceptable to treat them, to some degree or another, in
exactly this same manner; to treat them, as we say, ‘like animals.’ That is, we
have decided that treatment which is wholly unacceptable when received by a
human being is in fact the proper manner in which to treat a non-human animal.
(The Dreaded Comparison 1996, 18-19)
In a societal framework where the conviction that humans are superior to nonhuman animals is
abundant and powerful, this comparison between marginalized racial groups offends because it
seems to reinforce the insulting worldview that these groups are only as important as animals (so
therefore, they are deemed unimportant and disposable as animals are).
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But with a worldview that does not accept nonhuman animals as inferior or morally unconsiderable, a comparison between humans and nonhumans is nonthreatening. Many
indigenous cultures have traditionally likened humans to nonhuman animals and entities,
honoring a tribal member with an animal name and recognition of their personality as similar to
qualities of other animals. These comparisons between the human and the nonhuman do not
demean the human person because nonhumans are admired and respected as deserving agents.
Nonhumans are not dismissed as immediately and categorically dominatable.
So it is the hierarchy itself that is problematic, maintaining that humans are superior to
nonhumans and that nonhumans deserve lesser treatment because they are inferior. The problem
is not the comparison between humans and nonhuman animals but the logic of domination
whereby violence is perpetrated.
The logic of domination serves to justify the subordination of a target group. Insofar as
human groups are marked as “subhuman” and “animal,” the subjugation of these groups is
permitted under the logic of domination. This logic does not merely support the domination of
nonhuman animals thought to be lesser than humans, but equally supports the domination of
human beings who do not seem to fit the “ideal” of a human. Historically in America these
individuals have been Jewish, Black, Native, LatinX, Asian, female, transgender, queer,
incarcerated, or otherwise “deviant” from the white, cisgender, heterosexual, Christian man.
It may seem as though the prudent fix for this problem of dehumanization is simply to
ensure that marginalized groups of people are uplifted and never made despicable through
animalization. However, this “solution” hardly reaches the underlying cause of oppression. It
does not erase the mechanism of harm, namely that being considered “animal” pushes one
outside of moral consideration. This idea that animalizing a human means you can treat them
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however you want is an unargued for view, and a dubious assumption. Spiegel reminds that it is
the shape of oppression to relegate groups to the subjugated position, and that groups are
commonly dismissed as unimportant and their social justice causes insignificant in the face of
other issues:
Only through a rejection of violence and oppression themselves will we ever find
a long-term ‘freedom and justice for all.’ It is not an ‘either-or’ situation; the idea
that one group will have its rights protected or respected only after another ‘more
important’ group is totally comfortable is finally being widely recognized as a
delay tactic used by those resisting change. Women were told to keep waiting for
years for their right to vote because other issues were ‘more important.’ Black
people in the United States were told that their slavery was an ‘economic
necessity’ to be continued for the good of the country. Until the reforms of the
early 1990’s, blacks in South Africa were still being told that apartheid was
necessary. Necessary for whom? Surely not the people who were living under this
form of slavery. (Spiegel 1996, 18-19)
We must address the violence of atrocities by attending to the deep mechanisms that set them in
motion. So long as the logic of domination is deployed as a justification mechanism for harmful
actions, human groups will be dominated and victimized just as nonhuman animals are.
The solution to the problem of genocide cannot be the Katzian stance, nor can we afford
merely to preserve the term for atrocities against humans only. The real harm comes from the
fact that worthy beings are excluded from our moral consideration – beings both nonhuman and
human. Redefining the boundaries of our moral consideration to include nonhuman animals
would prevent the logic of domination that allows for human subordination through their
animalization. For being called animal would no longer authorize violent treatment. Using the
term “genocide” to talk about violence against nonhuman animals illuminates the logic of
domination at play that allows atrocities to occur, its victims human or nonhuman.
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Other terminology
Even if one wishes to take seriously the issue of our treatment of nonhuman animals and
believes nonhumans to have moral worth, one may still want to isolate the use of the term
“genocide” to human instances. Proponents of this position may be content with identifying
atrocities against animals with another term. In his book A Plea for the Animals, Matthieu Ricard
argues to extend moral consideration to nonhuman animals and yet maintains that “genocide” is
an inappropriate term to describe harms against nonhumans. “Genocide” is an illicit term for
violence against nonhumans, he argues, because the UN reserves this term for violence against
humans. Ricard does not question this definition and advocates instead for the term “zoocide” to
describe genocide-like atrocities against nonhuman animals. As I have already discussed, this
disregard for the nonhuman application of genocide cannot be justified through an appeal to the
UN’s definition, which has already been criticized for its narrowness, nor justified
etymologically. Proponents of alternative terms must offer further argumentation for why
“genocide” ought to be reserved for humans only and why, exactly, the term is inappropriate in
discussing nonhuman contexts.
Others may resist “genocide” because it seemingly cannot characterize how we treat
animals. Cary Wolfe writes that the comparison between treatment of nonhuman animals and the
Holocaust is deficient because nonhuman animals have actually received worse treatment than
victims of genocide. Many more billions of animals have died and continue to die in industrial
farming than people died in the Holocaust, he says (Wolfe 2009, 567). Wolfe here implies that
“genocide” cannot go far enough to describe the atrocities committed against nonhuman animals.
However, a focus on body counts does not fully consider the kind of harm that is suffered
by victims of genocide. “Genocide” describes a harm beyond what the term “mass murder”
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describes. Mass murder only denotes physical death, where genocide (as I will argue in the next
section) inflicts physical and social death. There are central characteristics to genocidal violence
that cannot be captured with the term “mass murder.” Certainly genocide usually includes a kind
of mass murder, but it also imposes further harms upon victims. If we recognize these physical
and social harms among nonhuman victims, then, against Wolfe, we must appropriately call such
violence “genocide.” Alternative terms are likely to fall short of accurately describing the central
features of genocidal violence. For instance, some scholars have called the human-nonhuman
relations a “war” (Wadiwel 2015). But this term is unsatisfactory since it erases victimhood and
seems to connote that the perpetrator group and the group receiving violence are somehow equal
opponents, both willingly engaging in their tussle with one another.
There is also a movement to recognize “ecocide,” or the massive destruction of our
global environment. The term has some similarities to “genocide,” with an intonation that evokes
genocidal images. It was first brought into legal use by Arthur Galston at the Conference on War
and National Responsibility in 1970, addressing the harmful ecological effects of Agent Orange
as a biological weapon. His proposal suggested “that environmental destruction can have a
genocidal impact and also that the environment can be seen as a victim of ecocide in the same
way a social group of people can be seen as victims of genocide” (Crook & Short 2017, 45). In
2011 the term received greater attention after Polly Higgins published Eradicating Ecocide and
launched a website advocating for the addition of ecocide to the UN’s list of crimes against
peace – under which genocide is already listed. By her definition, ecocide is “loss or damage to,
or destruction of ecosystem(s) of a given territory(ies), such that peaceful enjoyment by the
inhabitants has been or will be severely diminished” (Higgins 2018).
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Legally, “ecocide” makes sense as an apparatus for corporate, national, and international
accountability. It also expresses something specific and fresh about destruction against
landscapes, ecosystems, and other abiotic ecological entities and processes. However, “ecocide”
does not capture the specific harm of genocide, namely the social harms that are imposed onto
and felt by nonhuman animals. Also, by employing a term specifically for the destruction of
nonhuman ecosystems – that is, a separate term from the term used to identify violence with the
same characteristics against humans – it does not challenge the logic of domination that makes
genocide possible against both humans and nonhuman animals. Using the term “genocide”
reflects what is really a blurry and questionable distinction between humans and other animals.
Whether the victim is a human or nonhuman animal, there are central features to genocide that
allow it to be identified across species lines.
The next portion of the paper addresses these particular harms that genocide inflicts.

Nonhuman social death
Having addressed some objections to the use of “genocide” for nonhuman contexts, I
have not yet justified any application of the term to nonhumans. Is it appropriate to describe
harms against nonhumans as genocidal, or to recognize nonhumans as victims of genocide?
Which contexts might support the use of the term? I turn to these questions now.
We must first recognize that there is no unifying definition for what “genocide” is, even
among scholars in the field of genocide studies. Every single clause of the UN’s definition of
genocide, as stated by the 1948 special convention, is controversial. One major movement within
genocide studies has been to elucidate gender issues in the harm of genocide, which raises
definitional questions such as whether women (or other genders) can be a victim group and
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whether instances of mass rape ought to be identified as genocide. What genocide is and how to
recognize it are by no means closed issues. I highlight this state of the field because the
consideration of nonhumans in relation to genocide does not upturn established principles or
convictions in genocide studies. Who victims are and what kinds of distinct harms they suffer
remain open topics in the scholarship.
To consider nonhumans as victims of genocide, a working definition of genocide would
need to be specific enough to identify the particular harms of genocide against other crimes, yet
broad enough that nonhumans could be included as victims. Under the UN’s definition, genocide
can only be committed against “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (UN 1948). While
this definition cannot accommodate harms against nonhumans (unless nonhuman victims are
recognized as part of the identified groups), other definitions of genocide may – and such
definitions may also address further concerns with the UN description. I find philosopher
Claudia Card’s feminist concept of genocide especially compelling, not least because her
characterization leaves room to consider nonhuman victims.
Card spent much of her philosophical career secularizing use of the term “evil” to discuss
moral atrocities. In her 2010 book, Confronting Evils (hereafter “CE”), Card identifies genocide
among these atrocities as a particular type of evil that inflicts unique harms. That is, genocide
cannot be encompassed by other terms of atrocity such as “mass murder” or “torture.”
“Genocide” denotes a specific kind of inflicted harm, which she identifies as social death. In
contrast to other terms, “genocide” as social death does not necessarily include the infliction of
physical death. She argues both that genocide is social death and that social death is “utterly
central” to the evil of genocide. She comments that she wants to keep this “utterly central”
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descriptor rather open, but she clarifies that she means social death to be a salient characteristic
of most paradigmatic instances of genocide (PBS 2013).
Card borrows the concept of social death from Orlando Patterson, describing the
phenomenon as the deprivation or loss of social vitality. Patterson’s notion of social death hinges
upon natal alienation, such as in the case of slaves. Transported from their homeland into
subordination, slaves were rendered socially dead, “alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth”
(Patterson 1982, 5). Patterson writes,
[Slaves] ceased to belong in [their] own right to any legitimate social order. All
slaves experienced, at the very least, a secular excommunication. Not only was
the slave denied all claims on, and obligations to, his parents and living blood
relations but, by extension, all such claims and obligations on his more remote
ancestors and on his descendants. He was truly a genealogical isolate. Formally
isolated in his social relations with those who lived, he also was culturally isolated
from the social heritage of his ancestors. Slaves […] were not allowed freely to
integrate the experience of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their
understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings of their natural
forebears, or to anchor the living present in any conscious community of memory.
(Patterson 1982, 5)
Social death imposes this “secular excommunication” by alienating individuals from
connections to their group and diminishing their social vitality.
Card defines social vitality as “the meanings, shapes, and contexts given to the lives of
individuals by social relationships both personal and institutional, contemporary and
intergenerational, that unite them into a ‘people’ or other significant community” (2013). She
notes that social vitality presents in many forms, including through linguistic, educational,
artistic, political, economic and religious practices, but also – and perhaps most importantly –
through friendship and kinship networks. Social death is a major, “profound” loss of social
vitality, “a loss of social identity and consequently a serious loss of meaning for your existence”
(Card 2013).
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Card’s description of social vitality does not require that those who experience it must be
a “people.” Social vitality exists collectively but is felt individually. Groups with social vitality
may be united under the designation of being “a people,” but the more important factors for
social vitality are that these individuals exist in community and that individuals’ identities are
determined through the meanings, shapes, and contexts of the community. Victim groups need
not even recognize themselves as a group. Social vitality only requires that individuals identify
themselves as part of the group and draw their identity from being a member.
Though nonhuman animals are not typically recognized by Western societies as “people,”
this term is not necessarily restricted to human people. We might reconsider other species as
being kinds of “people,” as do many indigenous cultures and nonanthropocentric scholars.
Through her flexible characterization of social vitality, Card does not demand an anthropocentric
lens to understanding genocide as social death. Any group with social vitality, for whose
members that social vitality plays a central role in their lives, is a group that can suffer social
death. (Because of this focus on social death, it is important to note that the application of
“genocide” now primarily describes harms to human and nonhuman animals. I admit this
limitation and will return to this in a later portion of the paper; yet, it is valuable here to
acknowledge that other, non-social or abiotic nonhuman beings may not be immediately
included in Card’s approach.)
We must ask what kind of group can be vulnerable to genocide, for not all groupings
impart the social vitality that is destroyed by genocide. Any “group” reflects a collection or an
assemblage of parts, but not necessarily one that plays an important role in identity construction.
So, which groups may suffer genocide? Could there be a gay genocide? Is femicide a kind of
genocide? Card notes that though violence against gays may not be a paradigmatic instance of
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genocide, when the assault upon gays is systematic, it may be considered genocide. But it is not
merely the systematic quality of the violence whereby it is genocidal. Determining such
systematic harm against gays as genocide would be dependent upon examining “to what extent
the destroyed community had contributed meaning and identity to its members, and whether the
loss of those meanings would leave those members socially dead” (2013). It is possible for an
individual to be spared social death if they have other significant communities from which they
draw social vitality. Insofar as being part of gay communities substantially provides identity and
meaning to gay peoples’ lives, the destruction of such communities would inflict social death
upon them and would thereby be genocide.
To recognize instances of violence against women as genocide, the extent to which social
vitality constitutes group members’ identities would also need to be analyzed: for though
communities of women may serve to provide meaning and identity, it is less clear that genocide
could be perpetrated against women “at large.” Card says that “femicide” cannot rightly be
called genocide because being female is a category or class (Card 2013). There is no significant
determination of a woman’s identity as shared by a grouping of all women on the globe – that is,
she is not immediately or appreciably given meaning by being identified as part of the aggregate
of women. But smaller communities of women (which would nonetheless be included in a larger
designation of all women on the planet) might be victims of genocide if such a community
served to substantially provide identity to its members. Card leaves broad the content of the
substantial extent to which social vitality constitutes group members’ identities in order to
accommodate a range of genocidal instances. Regardless of differences in genocidal violence,
genocide inflicts social death: the forcible diminishment of the social vitality that significantly
contributes to meaning and identity in individuals’ lives.
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It is worthwhile here to say something about how group membership may be experienced
or determined by individuals in comparison to a group’s being externally determined. Card does
not touch on this aspect explicitly, but my additions are not incompatible with her position. She
and I are both interested in drawing attention to the real harms that victims of violence suffer.
For an individual member of a group, the “group-ness” that constitutes the group as such may
not be phenomenologically felt. Group members may not experience violence against them as
group violence, even though they may be externally identified or idealized as a particular group.
That is, a group need not be preconceived or otherwise defined prior to the infliction of harms
against their members. One’s group membership may be elucidated as violence against the group
occurs. Hannah Arendt famously suggested this phenomenon by saying: “If one is attacked as a
Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew” (Arendt 2000, 12). The suggestion I am making is
twofold: violence is not necessarily individually recognized as group violence, and groups may
emerge as groups while violence is directed against them. That is, the groupness of a group is not
always known or promoted by its members.
Additionally, group membership is rarely sharply or completely captured, since each
individual is part of multiple groups. As intersectional feminists have insightfully indicated,
membership in one group influences and changes one’s phenomenological experience in another.
A Black woman’s experience of membership in a group of women will be of a different sort than
a Native woman’s or a white woman’s or a trans woman’s. Because of this, we can hardly think
of group membership as static or with clear edges. We need an approach to analyzing violence
against groups that is sensitive to these nuances in group membership and individual experience.
Otherwise, the risk is essentializing a group in demanding a particular kind of “groupness”
character. Card’s focus on the social vitality that materializes from friendship and kinship
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networks escapes this kind of dangerous essentializing, since it examines lived relationships
between individuals to understand their role in a group.
That the groupness of a group is not easily or fully summarized and may only emerge in
situations of violence against the group helps us frame what to expect from nonhuman groups.
Card’s approach to understanding genocide requires that we closely examine meaningful
connections between group members, rather than relying on assumptions about what constitutes
a (politically recognizable) “group.” Conceiving of social groups in this way illuminates not only
the kinds of human groups that can suffer genocide, but also how nonhuman animals might be
victims of genocide. Their social death occurs within groups with specific shared social patterns
because their lives are constituted through those social bonds. Nonhuman groups may not
identify themselves to human observers as groups, yet their social practices reveal the centrality
of the social vitality they draw from their communities. Many animals – including humans – may
not recognize the importance of their group’s social vitality and their membership in it until the
group becomes threatened or compromised. Neither is their active recognition of their group
membership a necessary component of their social vitality.
Like women are a category or class, a species is also a category or class. Just as humans
do not draw social vitality from the whole of the human species, neither do other beings draw
their social vitality from the entire class of their species. Social vitality is created intimately
through the connections that individuals cultivate with one another. Therefore, it may not make
sense to talk about genocide against whole species, unless very convincing evidence arose that
kinship networks stretched meaningfully to every individual in a species.2 For my purposes in
this paper, though I often use the term “species” to discuss harms against nonhumans, I mean to
elucidate the social vitality and death of particular groups within species designations – which is
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where the social vitality and the social death may be felt. Humans do not experience genocide at
the species level, and neither do any of the nonhuman animals I will describe below. Because
social vitality is generated and maintained through local community groups, this is where
genocide also occurs.
However, the social vitality of groups of nonhumans is largely assumed to be absent, at
least outside of critical animal studies and ethology. Because nonhuman groups’ social vitality is
mostly unknown by humans, harms against nonhuman animals are often perpetrated against a
nonhuman “species.” Unlike attacks against other human groups, directed harms against
nonhumans do not tend to target nonhuman animals because of their specific group’s identity and
practices below the species level. That is, I am unaware of human attempts to diminish particular
groups of species members, except in bounded geographic ranges. Rather, nonhumans are
usually targeted at the species level: they are targeted for being members of a certain nonhuman
species population.
Card acknowledges that species themselves can be victims of atrocities (CE 112-113),
though she does not examine violence against nonhumans as genocide. She does not cite the
social death of nonhuman species. Yet her framework leaves space to consider nonhuman
animals: when we recognize social vitality in nonhuman lives and the social death they suffer by
violence against them, we are able to appropriately recognize nonhuman animals as victims of
genocide. Again, rarely is this social vitality to be observed at the species level. Social vitality
and social death are most easily seen in groups within species designations, because that is where
the social vitality meaningfully affects individual group members.
Though I am concerned with the multiplicity of atrocities harming nonhuman entities, our
purposes in analyzing genocidal violence are best served in examining social vitality of smaller
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communities within a species population.3 Nevertheless, I continue to use the term “species” to
talk about nonhuman animals despite its lack of precision in describing differences between
community groups within species designations. This conscious choice is meant to admit that
human actions against nonhuman animals at least purport to act against entire species. Aside
from this, my hope is that appreciating groups of nonhumans will flavor the term “species” so
that it does not preclude our awareness of the materially different communities that arise when
individuals interact with one another. That is, I mean to direct attention toward the particularities
of such diverse communities that create social vitality.
Moving from species-level theorizing and toward the social vitality of communities helps
to explain how genocide can occur even without extinction or total elimination of a group. Card
notes that loss of social vitality is “not all or nothing.” Human victims of genocide endure; there
are always some survivors of genocide. Nonhuman victims also survive genocidal violence. By
survival, we understand that (A) some individuals who have suffered genocidal violence persist,
(B) a community that has suffered genocidal violence may not be completely destroyed, and (C)
violence need not eliminate whole cultures or species to be genocide. We need not seek
examples that demonstrate the complete or near-eradication of a group to identify the occasion of
social death. Card writes, “The survival of a culture does not by itself tell us about the degree of
alienation that is experienced by individual survivors. Knowledge of a heritage is not by itself
sufficient to produce vital connections to it” (CE 77). Simply because a group persists does not
ensure its members are not experiencing social death. An observant openness to the narratives of
social vitality within and among species members is required to understand the ways of life that
contribute to their social vitality: how their interactions with one another constitute the practices
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and relationships that provide meaning and a sense of identity to nonhuman individuals and
collectives.
I anticipate an objection here to the social vitality of nonhuman animals. The concern is
about the difficulty of determining whether there is “identity” or “meaning” in nonhuman lives.
Because of this difficulty, this reasoning goes, we cannot attribute the experience of identity and
meaning to nonhuman animals at all. This objection is comprised of two problems: (1) a
categorical or metaphysical dismissal of animals and (2) the epistemological worry about
knowing whether or how other animals think and feel. I shall attempt to answer both components
of this objection.
(1) This objection relies upon certain notions of what “identity” and “meaning” are –
notions that not only assume specifically human forms of identity and meaning, but also
traditionally assume identity and meaning as dominant cultures have defined them. Such
dominant conceptions of social vitality have historically excluded other cultural epistemologies
and ways of being in the world. For example, the imperial British assumed that Indians were
spineless and lacking in integrity when they came to India, whereas Indians simply expressed a
more relational, family-centered notion of identity. The triumphant individual, as valued and
representative of identity to the British, was not present in the Indian ontology. This is not
because Indian culture has less identity or worse notions of identity; the white, Western
conception of what that identity ought to be was used to subordinate those that British thought
were inadequate. Further, human cultures who have expressed their identity outside of the white
Western conception have frequently been labeled by their dominators as subhuman and animal.
Such labels have served to logically justify the subordination of these groups. For a truly
sensitive ethic, we must leave these concepts of identity and meaning open to the plurality of
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experience even across species designations, lest even marginalized humans be harmed through
these frameworks.
I am suggesting that the metaphysical assumptions about human superiority prevent us
from seeing identity and meaning in places other than in ourselves. The British dismissed the
Indian perspective because of the metaphysical assumption that their own worldview was
invincible and superior. A similar conviction about human identity and meaning can
categorically and totally block our seeing any alternative, even when nonhumans possess identity
and meaning.
(2) It is sometimes a great challenge for us to understand and communicate with
nonhuman animals. Yet it is possible. Ethology and other biological work continually expose
insights into the lives of nonhuman animals that many were previously unable to see, likely
because of metaphysical blockage as described above. There is indeed an epistemological
difficulty in understanding what identity and meaning consist in for any nonhuman species, but it
does seem possible to determine. We must be willing to call these features what they are, in full
knowledge that humans and other animals share many evolutionary characteristics (although
they iterate quite differently from species to species). We must recognize these shared qualities
or else commit De Waal’s anthropodenial. We receive glimpses of nonhuman identity and
meaning because we are familiar with these features in ourselves. We can understand nonhuman
social vitality because it is similar to our own.
Card’s depiction of social vitality allows us to recognize that relationships and communal
practices are central to identity constitution for group members. They recognize themselves
within their kinship networks, differentiating themselves from other members of their
communities and recognizing their role in the group. These are evolutionary necessities, skills
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that ensure survival. Identity need not be defined as self-reflective capability or ability to
abstractly define one’s station in life through category descriptions. Identity is placing oneself in
relation to others. Meaning emerges from these interactions of individuals with each other: the
social interaction between individuals of a group makes an individual’s life positive, fulfilling,
healthy, and whole. We need not necessitate that other species demonstrate meaning through the
same lingual and semantic ways that is attributed to humans. By observing the behaviors of other
species, we can understand how many species are socially adapted and that their cooperative
practices contribute to their wellbeing. Humans are one of many such species who draw health
benefits and purpose from our connections with one another. Card herself does not rely upon an
anthropocentric definition of wellbeing: “Harm is intolerable when it prevents the party harmed
from doing minimally well, from enduring at a certain threshold of well-being. Bare survival is
not enough” (CE 102).
Wellbeing constitutes a meaningful life. Put another way: a meaningful life for (at least
some) nonhuman individuals might be understood as the fulfillment of bodily and social
capacities, feeling connected to one another, and living healthfully to the extent they can. These
characteristics are observable in ethological work and otherwise through careful attention toward
nonhuman beings. Such social capacities, behaviors, and connectivity that contribute to
nonhuman wellbeing are not unlike our own human search for meaning. Therefore, if wellbeing
is compromised, we can justifiably expect meaning to be compromised.
Another way to talk about meaning is through the experience of joy, which is widely
shared across species lines. Even though the happiness of nonhuman animals is contested
theoretical terrain, Carl Safina writes that feeling joy and the enjoyment of life clearly give
meaning. He comments that whoever cannot see joy in other beings is just not looking:
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You have to deeply deny the evidence to conclude that humans alone are
conscious, feeling beings who can enjoy living and desire to continue doing so. In
other words, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. People who play with a
dog – or a squirrel or a rat – and then believe that the animal lacks consciousness,
themselves lack a certain consciousness. (Safina 2015, 288)
As human animals, we often use the concept of happiness to convey our wellbeing. Joy gives
shape and substance to our lives, and we often seek situations that bring us enjoyment for our
physical and mental health. Nonhuman animals also pursue joy. If we understand happiness to be
so influential to our own human meaning and wellbeing, how can we deny meaning to other
animals who express joy?

Card’s definition of genocide as social death has been transformative to genocide studies,
aside from its possible application to nonhuman groups (which I will explore in detail in the
following sections). Card’s approach has been especially influential to refocus theorizing about
genocide upon victims’ experience, highlighting the need for a feminist account of the harm of
genocide. Besides supporting an inquiry into the social vitality and imposed social death of
nonhuman animals, Card’s understanding of genocide as social death has greatly contributed to
the field of genocide studies. Her approach is worth supporting because of her understanding of
intent and the genocidal harms that linger past body counts.
As the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is
currently formulated, intention is primarily emphasized in determining the occurrence of
genocide. This definition does not identify the specific harm that genocide inflicts upon its
victims, as opposed to the harms of other crimes; phrases like “physical destruction in whole or
in part” do not pinpoint how, exactly, genocidal violence is phenomenologically felt, and nor
does “serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” differentiate such harms from
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other atrocities. Because these phrases are broad and unspecified, the identification of genocide
instead emphasizes genocide as it is perpetrated rather than through its effects upon victims.
Intent of the perpetrators, then, is suggested as a primary feature of genocide.
While intent is still a component of imposing social death, according to Card, her
definition decentralizes this common conception of intention in the recognition of genocidal
occurrences. By Card’s characterization of genocide, we can name the harm of genocide by
observing its particular effects. This is possible because the harm of genocide cannot be
encompassed by any other harm. Social death is the central mechanism of genocide. By
decentralizing intent in the definition of genocide, Card also avoids some of the problems that
the UN Convention faces regarding intention. For the UN definition lacks clarification of the
term “intent.” How is intent to be determined, and what does it consist in? Card notes that though
genocide scholars widely agree about including intention in any definition of genocide, they are
divided about how “intent” is to be defined and proven. The UN definition hardly gives
guidance. Card re-defines intention broadly, noting that the harms of genocide can be the
primary aim, a means to achieve a further aim, a foreseeable outcome, or a reasonably
foreseeable outcome even when it may not have been foreseen (CE 257). Intention is an
important element of genocide, but Card’s recharacterization both focuses upon victims’
experience and broadens the scope of intentional acts.
The phrase “destroy in whole or in part” of the UN definition has also supported a
dominant trend in genocide theorizing whereby genocide is often characterized and determined
by the number of people killed. James Snow writes that this emphasis on body counts may come
from the expertise of quantitative social scientists working on genocide. Because quantitative
reasoning is respected as appealing to “impersonal science and consensus,” the numbers of
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people killed “are thought to be a reliable measure of the sheer magnitude of the evil of
genocide” (Snow 2018, 136). Body counts have been used to compare genocidal instances,
sometimes even to dismiss genocides because they are not of great enough magnitude. The
concentration on body counts has also been used to cement the Holocaust as paradigmatic of
genocide (Snow 2018, 136).
Card’s attention to social death moves the conversation from quantitative comparison to
the qualitative plurality of experience. This attention beyond the body count is a feminist
understanding of genocide: “What we notice, through a feminist lens, is influenced by long
habits of attending to emotional response, relationships that define who we (not just women and
girls) are, and the significance of the concrete particular” (Card 2003, 64). With the recognition
that women and children are also often disproportionately affected by genocide, Card affirms
victims’ experience of the loss of social vitality – the destruction of relationships that give their
lives shape and meaning. Social death is not incurred merely by the physical death of one’s
relationships, but the social harms that can make one’s life unlivable.
Rape, then, is affirmed as a genocidal act insofar as it forces social death. This is perhaps
most clearly exemplified in the thousands of rapes, disembowelments, and genital mutilations of
women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that occurred as continuation of the
Rwandan genocide. Besides the likelihood of experiencing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in
wake of the violence done them, women victims in the DRC are also socially isolated, often
ostracized from their families because they are then seen as impure. Victims are dishonored,
shamed, and deprived of social support. Cast out, they are at risk for further abuse (Human
Rights Watch 2009).
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Attending to the emotional response of victims, the relationships that define who they
are, and the significance of their particular material lives, Card’s understanding of genocide
remains underappreciated. Its attention to material reality directs us to carefully examine the
social vitality and concrete particularities of victim experience and the harms of genocide. This
feminist examination of social vitality can also be addressed toward nonhuman animals. With
social death and Card’s broad characterization of intent as my frame, I inquire into the social
lives of nonhuman animals, identifying manifestations of social death that may be genocidal.
One notable difficulty in employing Card’s framework to instances of violence against
nonhuman animals is that there is little public intuition about genocidal instances against
nonhumans. Because her theory of genocide focuses upon human beings, her recognition of
genocidal instances can rely upon prior societal intuitions about violence against other human
beings. Although not necessarily widely reliable, there is a widespread sense of what the
violence of genocide entails: that groups of people are targeted for their identities and suffer the
imposition of social death via violence against them. Part of this “sense” is the awareness that
genocide is commonly perpetrated by the state upon its own people. Card does not express this
component of genocide in this way, instead identifying genocidal violence as “systematic” (CE
249). She does not further define her use of this word, although perhaps it touches upon these
intuitions about genocide against human victims. I am not sure if Card would have agreed that
genocide can only be perpetrated by a state government or state force; however, this assumed
component of genocide is likely relevant to the evaluation of violence against nonhumans.
Perhaps we can understand “systematic” violence as perpetrated repeatedly by a group in
a position of power. This would seem to echo the apparent reality that genocide is perpetrated by
the state, a collection of people in a position of power. However, could a power minority or
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single person ever commit genocide, perhaps in a single act of rage? Practically, such a situation
is unlikely to be genocide because social vitality is actually quite robust. Genocide takes force
and organization to commit. Card talks about some genocides as progressive violence, that
genocide takes time to become full-blown genocide (CE 239). In formative stages, structures and
organization may be created and implemented to enforce targeting. Before the Rwandan
genocide officially began, for example, the Hutu government published propaganda that
demeaned Tutsis and likened them to cockroaches, thereby encouraging mass violence against
the Tutsi. Social death is imposed through repeated and often systemic means.
Genocide is not accidentally committed, even though under Card’s broad definition of
intention the harms of genocide can be auxiliary and not explicitly intended. An atrocity is
genocide when it inflicts social death – even when that social death was not the primary or
conscious intention of the perpetrated violence. So long as social death is a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of the violence, the violent actions are candidates for being genocidal. Card
asserts that no kind of (purported) unintentionality absolves a perpetrator from moral
responsibility for their harms. Undesirable outcomes yet carry moral weight that Card wants to
recognize as part of one’s intent. Therefore, reasonably foreseeable harms are understood as
equally constituent of intention as explicit intention.
Genocide targets victim groups for their identity as a group. Perpetrators often purport to
target a group for reasons other than attempting to inflict social death, such as rationalizing
vengeance or survival as justification for violence. But underneath this rationalization is a
targeting of the victim group for who they are as a group, rather than for what the group has
done. Genocide does not target random individuals, nor does it target coincidental aggregates of
individuals. The targeting is not arbitrary and is tied to the identity of the victim group – that is,
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victims are noninterchangeable to their perpetrators. Although a group’s actions are inevitably
connected to the identity of the group, genocide specifically aims at destroying victims because
of the social vitality they possess. As I will discuss with coyotes, nonhumans are also targeted in
this way, disliked for who they are. Such instances might be considered as genocide.
The instances of social death in nonhuman species that I will describe below share some
common features. Importantly, these instances of social death have been imposed by human
action. I have grouped my examples into categories that roughly describe the human mechanism
that targets the animals and destroys their social vitality. If a group of nonhuman animals has
social vitality and that social vitality can be forcibly diminished, then that group can also
experience social death. In my examples, I have noticed that some social qualities are displayed
across species. These qualities might be used to evaluate whether species I did not examine here
can be said to have social vitality: presence of strong relationships identified by cooperation and
grieving habits among group individuals; traditions or distinctive practices particular to groups
within species; and social learning processes (accumulating knowledge of what to fear,
traditions, or communication patterns).
These are likely not the only characteristics of social vitality, nor do I wish to require any
specific criteria to indicate the presence of social vitality in nonhuman species. I present these
evaluative criteria as an observation of the examples I have chosen, and as a starting point only.
As ethological work continues to reveal groups’ behaviors and social patterns in their own
habitats, we will deepen our understanding of how social vitality displays among species groups
and what features it shares across species designations. My decision to discuss these particular
qualities and the species representatives below is due in large part because ethological
information about their social lives is readily available.
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Though my characterization of these criteria for social vitality might sound slippery, I
wish to resist the kind of arbitrary line-drawing that has enabled the exclusion of nonhuman
animals from moral consideration in the past. While Card’s definition of genocide cannot be
applied to every instance of violence against nonhuman animals, it is also inappropriate to
demand a narrow conservative definition of genocide that immediately prevents the recognition
of genocidal harms against nonhuman groups. Critical animal studies and ethology are growing
areas of research that have challenged our assumptions about nonhuman animals greatly in
recent years. In light of their fresh contributions to our understanding about the lives of
nonhuman animals, we will avoid further entrenching unhelpful biases by holding open the door
for continuing illuminations about the richness of nonhuman being-in-the-world.
For any instance of violence against human or nonhuman animals, there are three
indicators of genocide: (1) the social death of a group that is at least a reasonably foreseeable
outcome of a harm, (2) that a group is not random but targeted for their identity in the group, and
(3) that the violence is systematic: structured and repeated violence perpetrated by another group
in a position of power, often a state government or ruling body. Card is not explicit about these
indicators in a logical manner, nor does she wish to identify these features as necessary or
sufficient conditions for genocide. The reasoning behind this fluid description of genocide is to
ensure that the definition of genocide is not so narrow to exclude any instances we otherwise
identify as genocide. The challenge is both to adequately characterize genocide across its
historical occurrences and to allow for the unique features of genocide that may be perpetrated
currently or in future, such that those instances may also rightly be defined as genocide. Such
analysis does not lend itself easily to requisite characteristics. However, it does seem that the
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imposed social death of a group as a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the intention to commit
violence against the group is the shared, central aspect of genocide.
In each of the following examples I evaluate, the unencumbered social vitality of these
nonhuman animals is crucial to their wellbeing. I have recalled relevant ethological information
about the lives of nonhuman animals to show their social vitality and the related social death
imposed upon them by human violence. Then the task is to examine whether that social death,
experienced by groups of nonhuman animals, is appropriately identified as genocide. Does the
species display social vitality or show signs of social death? Was social death at least a
reasonably foreseeable outcome of harm? Can the harm be considered systematic? Following
Card’s characterizations of social vitality and intention, we can begin to analyze how violence is
felt by some nonhuman animals and inquire whether that violence is rightly called genocide.

Predator elimination programs: coyotes and wolves
Coyotes and wolves are deeply social animals, and both have been identified as closely
similar to human beings in social structure, social intelligence, and adaptiveness (McIntyre 2019;
Flores 2016). Both species are communally-based, living primarily in groups with family
members, mates, and close companions. Coyotes often hunt alone, although they also regularly
hunt in pairs and with pack members when pursuing particularly large prey. Wolves rely heavily
upon collaboration with other pack members to survive and can only bring down a large prey
animal by themselves if they are a very skillful, experienced hunter. Both coyotes and wolves
pass information along to one another – laterally across pack members of similar age and also
through generations. Coyote and wolf pups must learn virtually everything about their world
from older members of their communities: they learn vocalizations, social structure and
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comportment, traditions, hunting techniques, who their rivals are, and territory. This stretches
beyond parental necessities as well; older coyotes and wolves mentor younger individuals to
whom they may not be related. Coyotes and wolves are constituted through their relationships
with one another, their strong social bonds and their place within their pack their identity.
In his book Coyote America, Dan Flores details the United States’ long history of
initiating governmental programs against wild animals. Federally-backed programs have targeted
large predators for decades, including mountain lions, bears (grizzly, polar, and black), wolves,
and coyotes. Since 1886, the government bureau currently called Wildlife Services, a division of
the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, has consistently waged violence against
coyotes across America. In Flores’ words, the coyote has been viewed as a dangerous
archpredator that deserves death (Coyote America 2016). Much like the language that sparked
the mass extermination of wolves in the US, the rhetoric against coyotes targeted their identities
as coyotes. What has always been a small concern about livestock losses to predators was
dwarfed by a full-scale attack on the species – violent measures incited not for what coyotes have
done, but simply for their presence upon American landscapes. In 2015, predation of livestock
only accounted for two percent of cattle loss (USDA 2015). Further, early National Park Service
management included the extirpation of predator species inside park boundaries, where livestock
predation does not occur. Wolves and coyotes have been demonized far beyond their predation
of livestock, called dangerous and unnecessary monsters on the landscape, a threat to wild prey
animals and humans (Flores 2016). Today, Wildlife Services continues to deploy campaigns
designed to “manage” “problem” wildlife, including against the coyote. Flores does not appear
shy in recognizing this violence against coyotes as genocide, although he is more comfortable
calling it “species cleansing” (Flores 2016, 115).
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The explicit intention of these government programs, at least historically, is the
elimination of the coyote species. Over the years, the bureau has used systematic hunting,
poisoning, and sterilization tactics in the attempt to eradicate coyotes from the American
landscape. Regional trophy-hunting practices and competitions have also been financially and
rhetorically supported and by federal and state programs. But from the earliest days of the
bureau, the fastest and most cost-effective method of violence was poison. Although many
variants of poison cocktail have been left in carcasses for coyote consumption, a particularly
virulent poison, strychnine, became commonplace in the early part of the 1900s. Death by
strychnine is especially horrid, causing the coyote to convulse and asphyxiate in an erratic,
curled-up posture. Other poisons, such as M-44 tubes of cyanide have also been used, planted in
the ground smelling like meat (Flores 2016). Cyanide baits of various design continue to be
implemented today. In addition to the deaths these poisons are meant to cause, the poison baits
also kill other animals, including domestic animals. In 2017 an Idahoan boy was injured and
watched his dog die from a cyanide bait in his backyard (Opar 2017).
Predator elimination programs cannot be cited as unintentional or even ignorant of the
social vitality of the target animals. The social death of the animals is certainly a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of waging violence against them. This is especially evident in the bureau’s
response to coyote social learning processes, for coyotes’ adept social intelligence and
connection to one another complicate the bureau’s violent procedures. The elimination programs
are shaped to actively work against the social vitality of coyote groups, because often their social
vitality gets in the way of the human intention to kill them. Use of the strychnine poison created
difficulties for the bureau when coyotes began to avoid the poisoned carcasses designed to bait
them. After watching pack members ravaged by the poison, which has a relatively immediate
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effect, coyotes learned to be skeptical of the poisoned carcasses that killed their compadres and
of the smell of the baits (Flores 2016, 145). Wildlife Services then began to use thallium sulfate
as their poison, which killed coyotes over the course of a few days so that the cause-effect
between the bait and death was obscured. Thallium sulfate also attacked healthy coyote social
practices, causing blindness and loss of foot pads and pelage that led to suffering, freezing, naked
and blind coyotes huddled together (2016, 146).
Because of the systematic poisoning and shooting of pack members, coyotes and wolves
lose the social guidance and membership from older pack members. The “problem” wolves and
coyotes who prey on livestock usually do because their packs have been disrupted and
youngsters have not learned the adequate skills for hunting wild, unconfined prey (McIntyre
2019). Shooting and trophy hunting only exacerbate fractured wolf and coyote social structure.
After the famous Yellowstone wolf 06 (Oh-Six) was shot in Wyoming, just outside of
Yellowstone park bounds, her pack members experienced upheaval. 06’s former mate 755 and
daughter 820 were exiled by other pack members, which would not have happened without 06’s
unexpected death. Nate Blakeslee describes the moment just after the shooting, where the entire
pack surrounded their dead leader’s body and mourned her, even when they risked danger from
being shot themselves (2017, 230). The main cause of death of wolves in Yellowstone National
Park is violence of rival packs, which wolves grow up learning to expect and navigate (McIntyre
2019). But 755 and 820 were never able to rejoin each other or their remaining family members.
Carl Safina asks, “Why can’t this family get along? They did – before hunters shot up the pack”
(Safina 2015, 217). This is striking given the strong bonds that wolves form with family and
other pack members.
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Although schisms within packs are not uncommon, rarely are communal loyalties
decimated. Father and daughter became outcasts from their own family bonds. Their happy
identities, created out of pack relationships, were shattered after losing 06. 06’s family and pack
experienced social death out of the trauma of her murder by a human hunter. Though this is but
one individual story of social disintegration among wolves, we can be fairly confident that other
wolf families and packs have been similarly affected by human hunters due to how important
wolf relationships are.
While trophy hunting may masquerade as mere sport, the support for trophy hunts from
governmental agencies clearly supports the systematic task of wolf removal. Again, this is a clear
case where the destruction of wolves as a species is clearly and explicitly promoted and pursued.
Predator elimination programs and their associated trophy hunts inflict social death, target
particular predators for their identities, and are systematic. Meanwhile, the wolves and coyotes
are individually, familially, and communally affected.

Poaching and commerce: elephants and whales
Poaching and hunting activities have incredible effect on species like elephants and
whales. Yet these practices may not widely be seen as genocidal because the justification given
for these practices is the instrumentalization of the animal’s body: elephants are poached for their
tusks and whales for their meat and blubber. It is less clear that the objective behind this violence
against elephants and whales is to attack their social vitality, and yet observations of both
elephants and whales reveals that they each suffer social death. This social death, imposed by the
human-perpetrated violence of poaching and hunting, can be considered genocide because this
social death is a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the violence against these species.
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Whale hunting is legal (though regulated), but poaching is illegal by definition. Though
restricted by governmental bodies, poaching is nevertheless supported through worldwide
markets. Legitimate and illegitimate trade perpetuate violence as animal body parts are sold and
bought regardless of national and international law. Because powerful economic structures
encourage poaching and hunting, these activities can be called systematic.
For their highly-desired ivory tusks, elephants experience a loss of social vitality. When
unimpeded by human violence, elephants live in family groups headed by a matriarch who is
usually the eldest female. She is the keeper of traditional knowledge of the group, that she only
passes on to her female successors. As the group roams, she directs their path to their heritage
migratory routes and toward seasonal water sources. They are also highly emotionally intelligent
and bond closely with their young and family members. Practicing intense grieving rituals,
elephants return to dead companions’ corpses and skeletons regularly and are known to carry
reminders of their fallen companions with them, such as a jaw bone (elephants communicate
with each other and show affection often by touching each other’s mouths with their trunks).
They sometimes bury their dead like humans do and have even been known to bury human
bodies after their deaths.
After losing family members to poaching, elephant survivors “have elevated stress
hormone levels for at least fifteen years, and give birth to fewer babies” (Safina 2016, 101).
Losing a matriarch – usually the eldest female of a family group who is also the leader – causes
the elephants loss of traditional, inherited knowledge. Baby elephants must be taught to fear
lions and other dangers, even carrying transgenerational understandings of which humans are
enemies as opposed to others who have not perpetrated violence against them. The maiming or
death of a family member triggers “devastating psychological consequences” and, when elders
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and matriarchs are killed, families are left unprepared and without valuable traditional
information. Some families disintegrate, intensely suffering (Safina 2016, 40). Without their
close bonds, elephants suffer and are unable to live according to their elephant customs. After the
violence, they often struggle to create new relationships. This undoubtedly demonstrates a loss of
social vitality.
Even aside from the suffering that individuals feel, it seems there is widespread evidence
of social death in elephant groups. Charles Siebert writes about this sustained trauma, seen across
Africa, India, and Southeast Asia, where “elephants have been striking out, destroying villages
and crops, attacking and killing human beings” (Siebert 2006, 44). These normally playful giants
are displaying vastly increased aggression against humans, which can be traced to the immense
suffering that elephant groups experience at human hands. “Decades of poaching and culling and
habitat loss… have so disrupted the intricate web of familial and societal relations by which
young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which established elephant
herds are governed, that what we are now witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse
of elephant culture” (Siebert 2006, 44). Elephants remember their aggressors as they carry their
trauma, and their social death is prompting their outrage against humans.
Whales also form strong social bonds with family pods and pass on regional traditions
through social learning. Whales occupy traditional ocean territories, where a clan consisting of
several pods inhabits occupies an area with different practices to clans in other territories. Orca
clans, for instance, are part of one of 10 different “ecotypes” who all have different customs, eat
different diets, and have differentiated communication patterns.
Young whales spend at least two years learning how to perfectly sing the unique call of
their clan. Whale expert Shane Gero notes that sperm whales mark different cultures with
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distinct sets of codas. He writes in his piece “The Lost Cultures of Whales,” that “Families that
share the same dialect we call a clan. The whale families in the Eastern Caribbean Clan use 22
different coda patterns…. Families that speak different dialects, from different clans, will never
interact” (Gero 2016). Since whales must teach their cultural songs to their young, it is therefore
very likely that whales indeed experience social death. The Eastern Caribbean Clan is
diminishing every year because of human influence, and as Gero writes, “we are losing a way of
life, a culture – the accumulated wisdom of generations on how to survive in the deep waters of
the Caribbean Sea” (Gero 2016). As whales are hunted, knowledgeable elder clan members are
unable to pass their traditional practices onto younger clan members.4
Whales grieve their wounded and dead and are highly empathic. An orca in the Pacific
Northwest, J35, captured the world’s attention in 2018 by carrying her newborn calf’s corpse
with her for 17 days (Yong 2018). In a species so highly emotional and relational, it is hard to
imagine that their diminished social vitality does not cause them profound suffering. Whaling
and other commercial practices inflict social death by killing and repeatedly injuring several
species of whales (industrial fishing causes immense harm to whales through vessel strikes,
catching them in nets, or noosing them with fishing line). Although grieving is not sufficient to
indicate social death in nonhuman species, just as in humans, grieving does indicate strong
connections between nonhuman animals and does strongly suggest social vitality. Social death is
a kind of culture collapse: these individuals and families are unable to sustain their customary
practices and teach cultural knowledge to their young.
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The meat industry, pollution, and habitat destruction
This project of examining nonhuman animals’ social vitality opens the scholarship
toward further understanding of the social death that nonhuman groups experience at human
hands. Once we recognize that other species groups suffer social death, further analysis is needed
to determine when that social death has been imposed and can be identified as genocide. Guided
by Card’s framework, we can begin to analyze whether atrocities such as the current meat
industry, pollution, and habitat destruction are genocidal. If these human-caused atrocities
impose social death, they may be called genocide when the social death is at least reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of causing that harm. Although I do not have sufficient space to
fully analyze these atrocities here, I at least wish to introduce them and briefly comment upon
them since they are issues that deserve our serious attention.
In the case of the meat industry, it may be difficult to immediately see the social vitality
of chickens, turkeys, pigs, cows, and other animals who are used and slaughtered daily because
those animals are thoroughly controlled, confined, and “processed.” This complete management
of them actively prevents and damages their social vitality. Yet by observing species members
outside of these confinements, we can determine what social vitality looks like for healthy
populations and analyze whether current practices render the animals socially dead. These
animals are born into social death, just as Patterson explains that the children of human slaves
born into social death. Patterson describes this phenomenon of being born into social death as
“natal alienation,” whereby victims suffer the radical disconnection from their heritage and
cultural identity. Card notes that natal alienation is a form of social death and is genocidal when
it is coupled with intent (CE 264).
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Another difficulty is that a prominent rationalization for these practices obscures the
reasonably foreseeable occurrence of social death in factory farm animals. The objective of this
industry is the instrumentalization of animal bodies for consumption, not specifically to destroy
their social vitality. However, the destruction and prevention of animals’ social vitality is often
part of the practice of industrial farming. Traditionally, calves born to milking heifers are
removed early or even immediately at birth so that mothers and offspring are unable to bond.
Some heifers allowed to roam have hidden their newborn calves so that they will not be forcibly
separated. This separation is an attack on the animals’ natality: their ability to teach and connect
with one another and to impart important information about how to live in the world.
Finally, a common problematic argument asserts that industrial farming cannot be wholly
deplorable because it gives animals life by breeding them. I find this to be a confounding
statement, as it implies that miserable life is unquestionably better than death. Unlivable life, life
when socially dead, can hardly be said to be better than biological death. Many Holocaust
victims committed suicide when they could (Lester 2004), suggesting that many people would
prefer to be biologically dead rather than suffer harms that make their lives radically difficult to
endure, harms that attack their ability to live meaningfully.
It is important to note that a farming practice that honors and protects the social vitality of
its animals – one that does not impose social death upon them – would not be a genocidal
practice. However, meat production would still rightly be mass murder, or perhaps some other
kind of atrocity. The practice must actually impose (reasonably foreseeable) social death in order
to be genocide. That is, some practices may include the murder and suffering of humans and
nonhumans, but we identify genocide based upon the extent to which victims’ social vitality is
hindered. Mass shootings, such as the variety common in the United States wherein victims are
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grouped by geographic proximity, are grievable atrocities, but they are not genocide because
survivors and their families directly affected by the violence have meaningful social vitality
outside of the victim group. Their social death is not inflicted upon them through such atrocities,
although any murder and suffering is affecting and serious and is not trivial to undergo. The
social death is not the primary aim of the shooting, nor is it a means, and neither is social death a
reasonably foreseeable outcome.
Yet it is not simple to identify genocide, as not all situations that might be genocide are
readily apparent. The challenge in recognizing genocide is that the instances we believe to be
genocide are either already past or currently unfolding in history, and we can only examine the
similarities of these violent atrocities to determine what differentiates genocide from other
atrocities. Card’s definition of genocide as social death, as well as her broad notion of intention,
is designed to both observe the shared features of past genocidal violence and to allow room for
the iterations of genocidal violence in the future. Because the UN’s definition has allowed for the
exclusion of some genocidal atrocities, it is important to embrace a broader definition that will
illuminate genocides as they happen.
Importantly, Card’s definition is not so loose as to be superfluous and claim that
everything is genocide. Card writes that genocide is social death, but social death is not
necessarily genocide. That is, social death, plus the intention to commit the action toward social
death, is genocide. Some instances of social death that cannot be rightly called genocide are
banishment, disfigurement, illness, and self-chosen isolation (Card 2013). Natural disasters could
also cause social death, but these occurrences are not genocide because they are not humanly
inflicted.
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An interesting question does arise when considering natural disasters in our current
climate crisis. Where does human culpability lie when those natural disasters are exacerbated or
spurred by anthropogenic climate change? Natural disasters have increased in frequency and
intensity due to human influence, and we also actively pollute and destroy habitats around the
world. To what extent do these actions, which do not intend to cause social death, may be
considered genocide? A more thorough analysis is required than what I can provide here, but
certainly we can recognize that species already suffer social death because of human pollution
and habitat destruction.
Whales are not only victims of targeted whaling efforts but are also suffering massive
habitat loss. Orcas off the coast of Washington state have been dying, likely from a combination
of disease and environmental factors like diminishment of their main food source, the Chinook
salmon, and weakened immune systems due to industrial pollution. The orcas’ home waters have
increased six degrees in temperature (Robbins 2018). That water has warmed due to
anthropogenic climate change. Whales are also vulnerable to plastic pollution, dying of
starvation with bellies full of plastic trash (Borunda 2019).
In the past year, harrowing reports have also noted the massive death rates among insects
– especially the colossal decrease in honey bee populations and the increased frequency of
Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD). Although the exact causes of CCD are largely unknown, it is
likely that human pesticide use and changes in habitat and climate are contributors to this
collapse of honeybee society. At this point I am unaware of whether CCD can be considered
social death by Card’s definition, or how honeybees exhibit social vitality. The diminishment of
insects and whales are possible cases of genocide that need further attention. If a species group
experiences social death because of habitat destruction, pollution of their phenomenological
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worlds, and the diminishment of their community groups, these instances of harm could be
analyzed as genocidal.
Though species certainly suffer social death in the face of pollution and habitat
destruction that has been spurred by human action, it is not immediately evident that these
instances are rightly considered genocide. For, it may reasonably be argued, the diminishment of
these species was accidental to the pollution and habitat destruction – and even the pollution and
habitat loss itself may be unintentional to some other intended goal, viz. agriculture and
economic gains. However, the burning of fossil fuels is something we have collectively known to
damage planetary atmospheric health for almost 50 years, and we have since communally
continued to support the fossil fuel industry. While not every earthly citizen has equally
contributed to our current climate crisis, we can at least say that, collectively, devastating effects
of our addiction to fossil fuels constitute a reasonably foreseeable outcome of our actions. We
may not have intended climate change at the outset, but at this point we must admit our
collective responsibility for instigating widespread ecological devastation, potentially including
the burden of social death in some species.
Someone may respond to these concerns by invoking the Doctrine of Double Effect
(DDE), which is a philosophical principle that is used to justify actions with unintended
consequences. DDE applies to situations where an action produces a double effect; an action
creates one consequence that is a desirable good effect and another consequence that is an
undesirable bad effect. The doctrine is this: When an act will lead to both a good and a bad
effect, it is permissible to perform that action only if (1) the act itself does not violate a moral
principle, (2) the bad effect is itself not the means for achieving the good effect, (3) the actor
only intends the good effect and does not intend the bad effect, even if it is foreseen or expected,
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and (4) the good effect outweighs (or is at least equal to) the bad effect (Burnor & Raley 2018,
183).
DDE is frequently used to justify military bombings, where the collateral damage of
killing civilians is an unfortunate outcome of targeting and removing a terrorist. The DDE is also
commonly at work in contemporary climate issues to justify harmful practices such as
investment in fossil fuels and other short-term solutions. These practices seem to greatly benefit
human wellbeing, and climate change is an unintended negative effect of these practices.
However, this is not an appropriate application of the DDE because an investment in fossil fuels
is not actually of great benefit to human wellbeing. We know that a globally warming climate is
in fact disastrous for all of us. DDE fails to justify the continued polluting and habitat destruction
of our fossil fuel addiction because the good effect does not outweigh the bad effect.
Besides this inapplicability, I do not think the DDE is an honest or admirable justification
for harmful actions. Card also dismisses the DDE as a viable justification for undesired and
supposedly unintended consequences. DDE absolves the actor of their moral responsibility in
causing the negative effect, which Card does not accept. She writes, “if one can foresee the harm
that will result from one’s act and one chooses to do it anyway, one is accepting that harm as part
of the price of one’s deed [….] One may not like the fact that such harm results, and one might
never have chosen to cause such harm as either an end or a means. Nevertheless, one accepts it,
and that is a moral choice” (CE 258). Especially when individuals’ lives and social vitality are at
stake, it is inexcusable to shrug off one’s moral responsibility for inflicted harms. The horrific
harms of genocide are too great to be dismissed as an unfortunate result.
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I have attempted to address the limits of a Cardian understanding of genocide as they
have arisen in this paper. Because “genocide” is controversial and simultaneously immensely
important, theorizing about it is tricky and weighted. Questions about genocide cannot be settled
without thorough attention to individual atrocities and their specific harms. Whether “genocide”
can be properly used to discuss any atrocity requires this careful assessment of past and current
atrocities, as well as a willingness to see genocidal characteristics across violent instances despite
their incongruent contextual features.
One evident limit of this Cardian approach to genocide, especially when one takes
seriously nonhuman animals and entities, is that it is focused upon the lives of social animals. If
genocide is social death, and not merely the intentional physical murder of any species, clearly
genocide à la Card can only be perpetrated against social animals. Of course, all animals are
social to an extent, if only to mate and propagate their species. Yet not all animals derive their
identity and meaning from social relationships. With Card’s definition, more solitary animals or
animals for whom social vitality is not constitutive of their lives are animals who cannot be
victims of genocide.
However, this limit to genocide as social death hardly seems a limit at all. It is a mistake
to think that only atrocities termed “genocide” can and should impel our moral attention. Card is
adamant in her writing that atrocities are quite common and that we should not be blind to
instances of torture and murder simply because they are widespread. “There is a danger of
conflating ‘ordinary’ with ‘normal’ or ‘natural’” (CE 24). The frequency of the occurrence of
atrocities does not absolve us of our moral responsibility. Although atrocities against animals
who do not suffer social death is not genocide, it is not to be overlooked. “Genocide” need not
perfectly capture every ghastly atrocity. It is, instead, a perception of a particular kind of harm.
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Violence toward nonhumans must be taken seriously by recognizing the shared practices
and logical mechanisms that are used against both human and nonhuman groups. One powerful
way we engage in this recognition is through our rhetoric. Language contributes to and reproduces reality, and we should choose language that illuminates rather than obfuscates where
and how oppression iterates. Some advocates, especially in critical animal studies, want to use
terms such as “genocide” to reveal the anthropocentrism in our language. The central task seems
to be opening our language to its appropriate use in discussing nonhuman lives: “in order to have
any heuristic value at all, our language must respect the peculiarities of a species while framing
them in a way that strikes a cord in the human experience” (De Waal 2006, 63). Because we live
on the same planet and have evolved in common with other animal species for millions of years,
our language should be used to reflect our shared experiences across species lines – including the
ways we suffer violence.
The risk of social death is too great to have a conservative view of genocide. Those who
wish to defend a conservative, anthropocentric use of the term “genocide” must provide
sufficient justification for why we ought not be concerned about the social death of marginalized
human and nonhuman groups. A definition of genocide as social death, with Card’s broader
notion of intent, allows us to recognize shared mechanisms of violence against marginalized
humans and nonhuman animals. Speaking of “genocide” against nonhuman animals decenters
our anthropocentrism in acknowledging the social vitality of our fellow creatures.

I recognize that other scholars have used the term “Holocaust” to describe violence against nonhuman animals.
This paper focuses specifically on the word “genocide” and its use and usefulness to describing these situations.
Insofar as the terms “Holocaust” and “Shoah” are employed to indicate similar features between that atrocity of
genocide during German National Socialism and particular violence against nonhumans, I think that the comparison
can be made responsibly. Indeed, the Shoah has much history in common with treatment of nonhuman animals since
eugenics rose to prominence through the work of animal husbandry and breeding experts, and the engineering of the
death camps were inspired by Henry Ford’s assembly line modeled after an American slaughterhouse (these and
1
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other relevant details on this topic can be found in Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka, 2002). However, I find
that the application of “genocide” to nonhuman contexts is much more useful, for reasons I discuss in the section
“Nonhuman social death.”
2
One way we might conceive of such a species-wide social vitality is if a species has very few surviving members.
Yet current ethological evidence suggests that for most species, social vitality is built in smaller community groups.
3
This also helps us to avoid some of the problems in the debate regarding use of the term “species” and
“speciation,” i.e. that such terms unfairly limit or obscure the material existence of the individuals and the
relationships between those individuals that the terms attempt to describe.
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